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Abstract:
Not infrequently, the so-called Rule of Rescue gets invoked as an allegedly self-evident
constraint to the CBE-goal of maximizing health beneﬁt with a given health budget.
In this paper this constraint is critically analyzed. It will be argued that some of its
implications are worth considering—but not the inherently vague Rule as such.
1. Introduction
Our moral response to the imminence of death demands that we res-
cue the doomed. We throw a rope to the drowning, rush into burn-
ing buildings to snatch the entrapped, dispatch teams to search for
the snowbound. This rescue morality spills over into medical care,
where our ropes are artiﬁcial hearts, our rush is the mobile criti-
cal care unit, our teams the transplant services. The imperative to
rescue is, undoubtedly, of great moral signiﬁcance; [...]
It is in this wording that US-bioethicist Albert Jonsen (1986, 174) described
what he experienced as a common ‘barrier’ to the logic of pure cost-effective al-
location in health care. Those were the days when (relative) scarcity of medical
resources began to invite philosophers to take part in rationing debates. Jonsen
himself had been serving on various committees assessing new medical tech-
nologies. Drawing from these experiences he came up with the above-quoted
moral diagnosis. Although he backed off from any systematic evaluation of the
depicted ‘barrier’, he coined its enduring name: “rule of rescue”.
Since those days, the rule of rescue (hereafter: RoR) has been invoked as
well as criticized by various parties in the context of medical priority setting.
One prominent occasion to quarrel about the normative status of RoR was Ore-
gon’s attempt, starting in the late 1980s, to set up a fair prioritization list for
health interventions covered by Medicaid (see Hadorn 1991). A major attack was
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ridden against Oregon’s originally purely cost-beneﬁt-oriented approach (with
severe methodological problems in assessing beneﬁts that cannot be discussed
here), because it presumably prompted the media-covered death of 7-year-old
Coby Howard in 1987. The boy, suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia,
could most probably have been cured by a 100.000$ bone marrow transplant
which was, however, not covered anymore by public funding, but would have
been available some 6 months before. This event induced major changes in Ore-
gon’s health policy—changes that gave room to RoR. In Australia as well as
in the UK, RoR has even ofﬁcially and explicitly been accepted as a constraint
to cost effective allocation, although its proper and consistent impact remains
an open question (see MacKenzie et al. 2008; NICE-Citizens’ Council Report
2006). Cautioning voices have pointed to the increasing danger of a stakeholder-
interested invocation of RoR (see Moynihan, Heath and Henry 2002).
Much in line with Jonsen’s original thoughts, many people have come to ac-
cept RoR as a morally signiﬁcant ingredient in people’s moral make-up, as some-
thing to be respected in any acceptable health policy. In Germany, it has in par-
ticular been philosopher Hartmut Kliemt who introduced to a larger public the
principle (which he named “Akutprinzip”) and its relevance: The more acutely
life-threatening a condition, the higher the priority of its treatment in publicly
ﬁnanced health care—this he considers to be a widespread maxim and a ratio-
nal principle for prioritizing publicly ﬁnanced health interventions (e.g. Kliemt
2006).
Although they give some examples of RoR-required therapies (renal dialy-
sis, second chance transplants, artiﬁcial hearts) and identify some categories of
interventions that get posteriorized by RoR (prevention programs such as diag-
nostic screenings), neither Jonsen nor Kliemt nor many other RoR-proponents
go into much detail of RoR’s exact deﬁnition and thus its extension in assessing
medical interventions. Nor do they attempt to provide a systematic theory for
RoR’s exact place in justifying priority setting in publicly ﬁnanced medicine.
Rather, starting from the fact that people when asked for their fairness-
preferences in health care and otherwise have a strong inclination to follow
RoR, Kliemt and others embrace the view that RoR has a predominantly sym-
bolic function (Cookson, McCabe and Tsuchiya 2008; Kliemt 2006; McKie and
Richardson 2003). According to this perspective, adopting RoR functions as so-
cial glue, expressing inter-individual respect among citizens and giving a signal
of striving at a humane and caring society that wants to “save endangered life
whenever possible, hang the cost” (Connor 1991, 5). Consequentialists might
book “the enhanced feeling of security derived from knowing that one lives in
a compassionate society, where those in desperate need are not ignored” under
external utilities (McKie and Richardson 2003, 2411).
Maybe, this already marks the end of any more systematic evaluation, given
that “it is hard to form even the vaguest guess about the magnitude of ‘symbolic
value’—not only because effects are indirect and long-term but also the same
action may symbolise different things to different citizens” (Cookson, McCabe
and Tsuchiya 2008, 543). In the following I want, however, try to pursue theThe ‘Rule of Rescue’ in Medical Priority Setting 423
systematic analysis of RoR a bit further, thereby proﬁting from recent literature.
In the end, I will come up with some quite tentative suggestions regarding RoRs
proper role in health care allocation.
2. Specifying Uncontested RoR-Imperatives
Many of us will share Albert Jonsen’s diagnosis of a commonly and strictly felt
duty to ‘rescue the doomed’. However, this approval seems to depend on a rather
narrow reading of the conditions under which this ‘rescue morality’ is or should
be binding. Indeed, paradigm cases for usually unquestioned RoR-reference—
such as the lost sailors or the trapped miners—share a number of characteris-
tics, namely:
1. the victims’ visibility or identiﬁability;
2. acutely impending death of the victims;
3. a reasonable chance of effective rescue;
4. acceptable risks or costs to the rescuers;
5. exceptionality of occurrence.
Scenarios showing all of these features in once most likely qualify as situations
where many or most of us intuitively feel strictly obliged to undertake rescue
efforts. Moreover, we want others to feel correspondingly obliged. And we want
to live in a society where following such obligations is considered the decent
minimum. If there is such a thing as a common morality (as I believe it is), a
duty to rescue in such paradigm cases is likely to be one of its central norms and
a rescue disposition, a speciﬁcation of altruistic dispositions, one of its central
virtues. Being disposed to rescue the doomed means that facing a paradigm case
one would not start to balance pros and cons, to calculate opportunity costs—but
rather jumps in. Doing otherwise, would invite Bernard Williams’ famous one-
thought-too-much-argument that he held against consequentialism. To some
extent, policies have to mirror and conﬁrm our rescue dispositions. That’s all
water on RoR’s mill.
However, as soon as one or more of the listed features is not or not signiﬁ-
cantly realized—a thesis that will be argued for below—the rescue disposition
might and possibly should give way to weighing and justifying. To use Pettit’s
and Brennan’s (1986) convincing metaphors: the disposition (auto-piloting) gets
replaced by reasoning (piloting). Let us take a look now at how close alleged
RoR-health care scenarios resemble the miner and sailer paradigm and discuss
the implications of possible deviation.424 Bettina Schöne-Seifert
3. Analyzing Potential RoR-application in Health Care
Prioritization
As already mentioned, RoR in health care is commonly invoked as a constraint
on cost beneﬁt evaluation (CBE) which is in turn is frequently applied with the
aim to maximize aggregate health beneﬁt. It is important, however, to empha-
size that quite often rescuing patients from life threatening disease is also the
right thing to do in the logic of CBE. If CBE counts patient beneﬁts in terms of,
say, QALYs (quality adjusted life years—health economy’s standard summary
measure for health beneﬁt) then curing a fatal disease and thereby preventing a
patient’s premature death and restoring her to good or full health will ‘produce’
quite a number of QALYs: the more (statistically expectable) life years gained
and the better the resulting quality of life, the higher the beneﬁt. Only if the
costs of intervention are very high or else if the gain in extension or quality of
life is only small, CBE-based policies might consider the rescue not worth its
costs. It is here, that CBE critics possibly invoke RoR, demanding rescue with-
out paying attention to cost.
Assuming that we are and want to be disposed to follow RoR in paradigm
cases, the closeness or distance of health care interventions to just these cases
becomes a paramount question. Let us look for answers with regard to each
of those cases’ standard features, as listed above. In doing so, it is left open
whether these conditions are usually seen as necessary or sufﬁcient, since this
seems to be at considerable variance in various authors. In any case, the moral
relevance of these aspects is to be scrutinized.
3.1 The Identiﬁable Victims Condition
If there is any consensus in current prioritization debates, it is upon the impor-
tance of setting health care priorities ex ante, so as to furnish these decisions
with impartiality and transparency. Following this suggestion does, obviously,
imply that at the time of decision making neither beneﬁciaries nor victims of
such policies are identiﬁable. Only later, when rationing decisions guide patient
treatment, hic et nunc identiﬁability becomes an issue. RoR proponents who
give moral weight to the identiﬁability aspect want health policy to give prior-
ity to patients who—now unknown—will at the time of potential intervention
be identiﬁably sick over patients who—now unknown—will at the time of inter-
vention still be non-identiﬁable, but might beneﬁt more. This ‘second degree’
relevance of identiﬁability allows for a more distanced view of people’s inclina-
tion to privilege the visible than can be hold when being involved in an acute
rescue situation.
From such a distant (educating) view one can realize some boldly irrational
consequences: Rather than screening people susceptible for a potentially fatal
disease and treat them early, effectively and at low cost one would wait until
later—only to treat the very same patients at higher suffering, with higher risk
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Moreover, it has repeatedly been stressed that victim identiﬁability being
a morally irrelevant aspect cannot serve as a criterion for fair resource alloca-
tion because this would violate the principle of equality (Cookson, McCabe and
Tsuchiya 2008; McKie and Richardson 2003; Sheehan 2007). This is even more
obvious if one shift to the aspect of victim visibility that is quite often put in one
with identiﬁability, although the former implies the latter but not vice versa.
Repeatedly and in different countries with different health care systems single
patients or groups of patients who ‘got a face’ by media campaigns (sometimes
explicitly referring to RoR) induced changes in health policies (Hadorn 1991 and
1996; MacKenzie et al. 2008) while at the same time inviting critique for the un-
fair contingency of such media inﬂuences. I can only mention en passant, that
empirical research has with sophisticated methodology looked for the psycho-
logical underpinnings of the priority reliably given to the rescue of identiﬁable
victims (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997). According to these data the major cause
is not the visibility factor but rather the impression that a very high percentage
of the reference group can be saved (in the extreme case: the one single victim
being the reference group). The blatant irrationality of this framing effect does
not count in favor of the identiﬁability condition.
3.2 The Acutely Impending Death Condition
Giving priority to lifesaving, as RoR wants us to do, without an eye to calcu-
lating opportunity cost, has at least two sources of intuitive plausibility: the
urgency aspect and the biggest value aspect. In searching for people buried by
an avalanche every single hour of delay may signiﬁcantly reduce the chances of
survival. And if rescue efforts are indeed successful, the beneﬁciaries commonly
get back into their lives in full health or so the paradigm makes us believe:
reasonably enough, we presume the doomed to be healthy skiers or sailors who
could get out of the tragedy pretty much undamaged, perhaps with some vexing
memories and surely with a lot of gratitude. And since losing one’s life is typ-
ically seen as losing everything, the resulting gain is enormous. Both aspects
cannot simply be transferred to healthcare scenarios (nor into safety-planning
in road trafﬁc).
First, the urgency aspect, though part of daily work in emergency rooms and
intensive care units, disappears in ex ante prioritization. Here there is time
enough for weighing probabilistic beneﬁts and risks, for calculating direct and
indirect costs. In such a privileged situations the heuristic advantage of an
‘act-don’t-calculate!’-imperative cannot be inferred. Second, many patients, who
survive disease or accident by means of medical interventions do so at reduced
quality of life or only for a limited time and possibly at skyrocketing costs. This
is where medical lifesaving gets into tension with CBE.
To be sure, in many instances CBE itself favors to intervene in life threat-
ening conditions because patients are likely to proﬁt extremely, gaining many
more QALYs for money than do the less severely ill. But again, this does not
hold where improvement potentials are limited or treatments very costly. Giv-426 Bettina Schöne-Seifert
ing priority to medical life saving, even if this means a cut back in overall health
beneﬁts, is nevertheless considered fair by many, at least to some degree. This
holds true for both lay people and experts in ethical theory (Brock 2004; Hadorn
1996; Ubel et al. 1996).
In ethical theory the problem in question is often framed more general as
the tension between the two principles ‘sickest-ﬁrst’ and ‘maximizing aggregate
beneﬁt’ (CBE), where the ‘sickest-ﬁrst’ principle is interpreted as a speciﬁcation
of John Rawls’ difference principle that wants us to improve chances of fair op-
portunities of the the worst off with priority. Some authors (e.g. McKie and
Richardson 2003, 2409) see an important difference between both norms, be-
cause in their eyes RoR—but not the Rawlsean principle—requires the identi-
ﬁability condition. But not only is this condition one of the implausible RoR-
ingredients, as I have tried to argue above. RoR is, moreover, explicitly for-
mulated by some institutions without reference to identiﬁable patients. And,
ﬁnally, several authors do not take RoR to be conﬁned to lifesaving but extend
it to patients with severe suffering from nonfatal disease (for instance Hadorn
1996). Indeed, conﬁrmation of the difference principle might turn out to be RoR’s
most plausible aspect.
I can see three different ways to approach the tension between the lifesaving-
ﬁrst-principle and the goal of maximizing overall health beneﬁt. One is to live
with it on a muddling through balance, in line with a more fatalist reading of
Dan Brock’s observation:
“However, there seems no objective, principled basis for determining
how much priority to give to the sickest, that is, how much aggregate
health beneﬁts should be sacriﬁced in order to treat or give priority
to the sickest. Instead, the most one can say is that most people and
many theories of distributive justice have a concern both for max-
imizing overall beneﬁt with scare health resources and for helping
the worst off or sickest, but there is large indeterminacy regarding
the proper trade off between these two concerns when they are in
conﬂict.” (Brock 2004, 213; see also Sheehan 2007)
The second approach would indeed give lexical priority to life-saving (or improv-
ing the fate of the otherwise sickest), thereby violating the principle of maxi-
mizing utilities across areas and patients. The third way, most promising from
my genuinely consequentialist perspective, would look for a (consequentialist)
explanation of the sickest-ﬁrst-rule, one that might ideally serve as the missed
‘principled basis’ for the trade-offs in terms of aggregate health beneﬁt in stan-
dard measure. One such approach has been suggested by Eric Nord with his
“cost-value-analysis” to replace standard CBE (Nord 1999 and 2009). In a nut-
shell, Nord suggests to place value not linearly on any extra week of life or on
any extra unit of life’s quality gained by treating some patient by some inter-
vention. Rather he favors to build upon the idea that dying an unwanted pre-
mature death interferes with one’s hopes for realizing one’s life plans or one’s
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quality of life. This approach invites for re-evaluating and recalculating the
beneﬁt side of standard CBE, adopting the idea (behind RoR as well as behind
some prominent CBE critique (e.g. Brock 2004; 2005)) that within limits, life-
saving interventions deserve extra weight. It does, however, remain within the
foundational structure of consequentialist ethics since it aims at spending avail-
able healthcare bucks for maximal overall beneﬁt—beneﬁt that is conceptual-
ized more plausibly. This seems to be a promising road.
3.3 The Reasonable Chance Condition
Chances of success in rescue situations count in two dimensions: the chance
of rescuing as such (to ﬁnd the buried miners alive, to restore heart beat by
reanimating the pulseless patient) and the chance of afterwards getting those
victims to an acceptable state. In paradigm rescue scenarios, chances of the ﬁrst
kind will depend on circumstances, for instance on the time interval between
accident and rescue mission; often they are hard to calculate, leading to an in
dubio pro reo attempt to undertake rescue efforts. However, as with very slim
response rates in medicine, even the slimmest rescue chance would seem worth
the effort if they were not all too expensive. Ex ante planning for helicopter
or track hound capacities do not seek to provide the resources for worst case
scenarios—for reason of costs. Public health expenditures cannot afford billions
to rescue a single patient. This sensitive of super-costs will again be taken up
below.
The second dimension of rescue chances, getting the beneﬁciaries in an ac-
ceptable state, does as we have seen above not play an important role outside
medicine—but very well inside. Once more, this means a problem for the trans-
ferability of RoR to medical priority setting. As we all know, many health inter-
ventions do have but a very limited potential for clinical beneﬁt. Even in best
responding patients they might extend life time but for some weeks, improve
their well being by few percents only. Generally excluding such marginally ef-
fective treatments from the list of publicly ﬁnanced interventions seems reason-
able in times of tight budgets, given that individual trade-offs are but very tiny
(see Buyx, Friedrich and Schoene-Seifert 2009). However foregoing to save a
patient’s life, even if only for short time, violates RoR.
It does, but for good reasons. If our above analysis is plausible in that RoR
rightly reminds us to reevaluate the beneﬁt currency in standard CBE, foregoing
marginal individual beneﬁts is legitimate. After all, they do not noticeably help
patients to realize their life plans or potentials (the key idea of Nord’s (1999)
cost-value analysis). Hence RoR would have to be adopted in this respect.
3.4 The Acceptable Costs Condition
As already stated, rescue efforts that are super-expensive or rescue planning for
slimmest chance cases are a sensitive issue, both within and without medicine.
Where RoR seems deaf with regard to responsible social cost planning and where
Kantian ethics postulates the pricelessness of human life, real world politics428 Bettina Schöne-Seifert
can’t follow such ideals. It never could. This lesson has to be learnt even with
regard to health care, but this seems difﬁcult both with regard to ﬁnd reasonable
cut off points and with regard to general acceptability.
Witness a development to the contrary: According to a quite recent deci-
sion of the German Constitutional Court, German constitutional right requires
that statutory health insurance pays for non-standard medical interventions for
patients with otherwise untreatable life-threatening conditions if only there is
some evidence of “a not totally distant chance of healing or else a noticeably
positive effect on the course of disease” (BVerfGE 2005). Following this direc-
tion, there seem to be almost no limits to the obligation to provide potentially
life saving treatment—given that the Court decision neither refers to upper cost
limits nor to scientiﬁc evidence. As has been made explicit by various experts
(see Dannecker 2009) this is the wrong way. Most probably, however, RoR was
the Court’s background intuition.
3.5 The Exceptionality Condition
Paradigm rescue scenarios do not occur on a regular basis. They remain sudden
tragic unexpected events. This fact contributes to RoR’s intuitive plausibility.
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the explicit adoptions of RoR in Aus-
tralian health services as well as by the Citizens’ Council to the UK National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (see Mac Kenzie et al. 2008; NICE-
Citizens Council Report 2006) have included an exceptionality condition. Both
limit RoR to small groups of patients—a restriction that has come to be criti-
cized as broadly unfair, discriminating against patients who happen to suffer
from a non-orphan disease. Maybe the suggested reverse discrimination could
be justiﬁed with the disadvantages those patients have, given that research of-
ten takes little interest and little effort in coming up with treatments against
rare diseases. But apart from that, an exceptionality conditions for high cost
spending seems unfair and unlikely to be publicly accepted on the long run. It
does, however, provide further proof of the muddling through character of bal-
ancing alleged social glue against standard CBE.
4. Tentative Conclusions
In paradigm sailor cases, RoR gains intuitive plausibility due to several contex-
tual peculiarities. Transferring RoR into the context of medical priority setting
is much less convincing. Given its largely under-determined concept, one should
resist the temptation to allude to RoR whenever standard CBE would rule out
life saving treatments of a certain kind.
There is, however, a lesson told by RoR for medical resource allocation. Some
people (Hartmut Kliemt possibly among them) believe that CBE should be coun-
terbalanced by the social glue from following RoR in health care prioritization
or by its contribution to real fairness. But the lesson can also be understood dif-The ‘Rule of Rescue’ in Medical Priority Setting 429
ferently: RoR-inclinations might result from the insight that the beneﬁt of being
kept alive by medicine should not simply be translated in the number of QALYs
gained. This would require revisions of standard CBE that might prove worth
more effort.
A ﬁnal remark to the importance of a rescue virtue mentioned at the begin-
ning of this paper. Surely, such a virtue seems particularly desirable in medical
doctors (see Conner 1991; Hughes and Walker 2009). My critical analysis of RoR
is by no means incompatible with this view. Being virtuously inclined to rescue
patients whenever possible should be constrained, however, by the given frame
of limits set ex ante. Much like bay watchers have to do best with the given
amount of rescue boats, physicians have to realize the best for their patients
within the socially set medical limits.
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